Attention has recently been given to shortcomings and gaps in the governance regime for marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), especially with regard to the conservation of marine biodiversity. This paper provides a brief overview of existing ABNJ treaties and their associated governance bodies. Examples of the manner in which some gaps have been (or are in the process of being) filled are outlined. These examples suggest that given the political will, existing bodies could achieve significantly more. Additionally, greater involvement from those conservation conventions that have already proven themselves to be effective in areas under national jurisdiction, such as CITES and the World Heritage Convention, could likely be beneficial in ABNJ as well. However, the current arrangement of single-sector institutions poses difficulties when attempting comprehensive measures that require cooperation beyond individual sectors, particularly between sectoral and conservation bodies. Nevertheless, measures that would aid in the protection of biodiversity could, and should, be developed. To ensure their success, the active exploration and testing of new cooperative governance arrangement(s) will be necessary. Methods to inspire sectoral organizations to act may also need to be developed. Attention has recently been given to shortcomings and gaps in the governance regime for marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), especially with regard to the conservation of marine biodiversity. This paper provides a brief overview of existing ABNJ treaties and their associated governance bodies. Examples of the manner in which some gaps have been (or are in the process of being) filled are outlined. These examples suggest that given the political will, existing bodies could achieve significantly more. Additionally, greater involvement from those conservation conventions that have already proven themselves to be effective in areas under national jurisdiction, such as CITES and the World Heritage Convention, could likely be beneficial in ABNJ as well. However, the current arrangement of single-sector institutions poses difficulties when attempting comprehensive measures that require cooperation beyond individual sectors, particularly between sectoral and conservation bodies. Nevertheless, measures that would aid in the protection of biodiversity could, and should, be developed. To ensure their success, the active exploration and testing of new cooperative governance arrangement(s) will be necessary. Methods to inspire sectoral organizations to act may also need to be developed.
• Marine geoengineering is now regulated by international law
• Cooperation between existing agreements is rare, and needs to be improved
• Mechanisms to motivate sectoral organizations to act are required.
Introduction
The past decades have witnessed important legal and policy progress towards the better management of expanding human activities and their detrimental effects upon marine ecosystems.
However, this progress, which has resulted in the adoption of a wide range of legal and policy instruments and arrangements, is counter-balanced with the sobering news that the ecological success stories remain stubbornly few, particularly in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) [1] . 1 In general, marine biodiversity is under increasing pressures and most indicators show its condition as worsening rather than improving [e.g., 2, 3, 4] . In the ABNJ context, there have been increasing calls for a new global agreement to protect biodiversity in ABNJ (Druel and Gjerde, this issue) [5] . The negotiation of a new agreement should not, however, preclude achieving more through the improved implementation of existing agreements and related instruments [6] . This paper examines options for improving the efficacy of existing agreements, treaty bodies, international organisations and governance processes that are relevant to the protection of biodiversity in ABNJ.
There is a complex legal framework for the governance of ABNJ. In addition to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Table 1 lists the key agreements and institutions relevant to marine resource management and the conservation of biodiversity in ABNJ. These agreements can be sub-divided into two general groupings: 1) sector-specific conventions/treaties for the management of marine resource exploitation and maritime activities and their associated institutions and parties (henceforth the sectoral agreements); and, 2) conservation-oriented conventions/treaties, mandated to conserve species, habitats, and/or ecosystems and their associated institutions and parties (henceforth, the conservation agreements). These international agreements can be further categorised by their geographic scope -either global or regional.
<Insert Table 1 The ISA Council and Assembly meet annually.
Fish Stocks Agreement
The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Often treated as an RFMO it also has characteristics of an RSA (see text below). Meets annually.
a Technically, since the first meeting was not closed, the second was a continuation of the first.; i.e. two parts of a single meeting. b The combined merchant fleets of these parties constitute approximately 94.73% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet [7] .
The maritime sectoral activities with the greatest potential to affect marine biodiversity in ABNJ, and hence the agreements of interest here, are those concerning fishing (including whaling), shipping (including dumping and placement of wastes at sea), and seabed mining (which is still in the exploratory stage). Mining is overseen by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) based in Kingston, Jamaica; shipping is managed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), based in London; dumping is regulated through the London Convention and Protocol (LC/LP), the secretariat of which is based in the IMO headquarters in London; and whaling is managed by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), based in Cambridge, United Kingdom. Commercial fisheries are more complex: they are managed by regional fisheries management organizations/agreements (RFMO/As), and where there are no such agreements, by flag states. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), based in Rome adopts some binding and some non-binding fisheries related agreements, serves as secretariat for some (non-regulatory) regional fisheries bodies, and provides advice to all. These sectoral agreements rely mostly upon binding management measures, such as fisheries closures and shipping discharge restrictions. They also utilise voluntary measures such as recommended ships routing and reporting requirements. Compliance can be difficult to ascertain, however, as only some agreements have established compliance mechanisms [8, 9] .
Other human activities, such as aquaculture, recreational fishing and tourism, which can be of concern in coastal habitats, are not yet of concern in ABNJ, and space will not permit their consideration here. Submarine cable laying -which does occur in ABNJ -is governed in part by one of the oldest multilateral maritime conventions, the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (in force 1888), which aims to protect cables from damage, mainly from bottom fisheries and anchoring. Potential exists for conflicts between cable laying and other uses as well as potential conservation concerns that may in the future need to be addressed. for these sorts of options, sectoral cooperation is necessary.
At the regional level, the sectoral / conservation agreement sub-division also holds true, with RFMO/As primarily concerned with the management of fisheries, while regional seas agreements (RSAs) are primarily concerned with environmental protection issues such as pollution and the protection of regionally endangered species. As with the global sectoral agreements, with the exception of the two advisory Commissions noted in Table 1 , the regional fisheries agreements rely primarily on binding management measures; whereas the regional seas agreements employ a mix of binding and non-binding measures, but lack legal competence to manage or constrain key sectoral activities (i.e. fisheries, shipping, or mining) that may pose a threat to the environment.
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) is treated separately in Table 1 due to its unique mix of management objectives that are characteristic of both a RFMO and a RSA, and the balance it seeks to maintain between fisheries interests, scientific research, and conservation. This mixed mandate has produced some unique fisheries measures, such as a de facto moratorium on bottom trawling [11] -the only region to have done so. However, its consensus-based decision-making means that progress can be blocked on issues opposed by a small minority of parties. This has arguably been evident in CCAMLR's troubled, and to date unsuccessful, process to establish two large marine protected areas (MPAs) for the Ross Sea and East Antarctic [12] .
UN bodies without a direct mandate in resource management can play a role in raising awareness and in protecting biodiversity in ABNJ. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has published on high seas biodiversity issues [13] . The FAO has overseen the negotiation of the legally binding Compliance Agreement [14] Ample evidence exists of several geographic, sectoral, and governance gaps remaining in ABNJ [e.g., 22, 23, 24] . Admittedly, not all of these gaps could be filled using existing agreements / institutions.
For example, bioprospecting and subsequent exploitation of marine genetic resources is an issue on which diametrically opposed positions have been taken at the UN. A solution to the management of marine genetic resources in ABNJ is therefore unlikely to be found in adapting an existing instrument or agreement [25] . Nevertheless, as discussed in the examples below, there are a number of ways in which existing agreements could fill certain governance gaps.
Building regional agreements to fill geographic gaps
Perhaps the most obvious governance gaps in ABNJ are geographic; i.e. ocean areas where certain types of management and conservation agreements or institutions do not yet exist [26] . In the fisheries context, with some notable exceptions, 3 many of these gaps have been filled since the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement through the establishment of new RFMO/As. Beyond fisheries, regional agreements with broader conservation-based mandates for ABNJ remain the exception rather than the rule (Table 1 ). The opportunity therefore exists for the negotiation of new regional agreements for the protection of the marine environment and/or for existing Regional Seas
Agreements to expand their conservation-based mandates into ABNJ (Rochette et al, this issue).
Adapting to new circumstances: marine geoengineering
Existing agreements can also potentially adapt to new circumstances. In October 2013, Contracting Parties LC/LP adopted an amendment to the Protocol concerning marine geoengineering. Only listed marine geoengineering techniques are permitted under the Protocol and only for the purposes of legitimate scientific research as verified by a scientific review procedure [27] . The amendment currently lists only ocean fertilization, however provision is made for the addition of other marine geoengineering methods as they arise [28] . As an amendment, when it enters into force it will be legally binding on parties to the Protocol. This example highlights the flexibility of an existing instrument to expand to encompass new and emerging human activities. has been argued that adding a global trade component would support the regional decisions of the RFMO/As, and hence the invocation of CITES could be mutually beneficial for fisheries management [29] .
Notwithstanding the reluctance of some states, CITES is unique in its role as an international multilateral agreement that seeks to address conservation through trade measures. The conservation of marine biodiversity in ABNJ, as indeed within national jurisdiction, is a complex problem requiring multi-dimensional solutions. With its broad support, 4 extensive Appendices, and long history of implementation and compliance, the potential future role of CITES in the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity in ABNJ should not be discounted.
World Heritage designations in ABNJ?
Another global agreement which could potentially be applied to ABNJ is the 1972 World Heritage
Convention. The Convention represents a well-established vehicle for protecting places of Outstanding Universal Value. Although its application has, to date, been limited to land and national waters, there is growing interest in considering how its coverage could be expanded. 5 In 2011, the for developing management plans and monitoring compliance, and the range of measures available to address non-compliance. These hurdles need not, however, be seen as insurmountable.
The CBD EBSA process
In 2005 the CBD launched its EBSA process (described more fully in Dunn et al, this issue) designed to identify ecologically or biologically significant areas in ABNJ (and also under national jurisdiction when invited to do so). In 2008, the CBD COP adopted criteria for the identification of EBSAs [31] and, after a series of regional workshops, the first group of 48 EBSAs was considered at CBD COP 11
in October 2012. At the request of the COP a letter was sent by the Secretariat to the UNGA on 19
March 2013 introducing the EBSAs. This was distributed to state parties by the UN on 17 April 2013 [32] . By systematically describing ecologically important places in most parts of the global ocean the CBD EBSA process has aided regional capacity building and cooperation and has added significantly to the knowledge base upon which conservation efforts can proceed. In this respect it demonstrates that an existing conservation agreement, within its limited powers, can nevertheless contribute to the conservation of global marine biodiversity.
The CBD has also been active in other ways. It has elaborated guidelines for biodiversity-inclusive environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments specifically for marine areas, including ABNJ. In 2010, the COP adopted twenty Aichi Biodiversity Targets, two of which are particularly relevant to marine conservation. Target 6 seeks to seeks to establish sustainable fisheries by 2020, and Target 11 seeks to protect at least 10% of coast and marine areas (including ABNJ) by 2020 [33] . (This new target replaced the previous (unfulfilled) CBD MPA target of 10% by 2012 [34] .)
Although the CBD COP has agreed to specific MPA and fisheries targets, as noted above the CBD lacks the regulatory authority to directly implement them, either within or beyond national jurisdiction.
Rather, it relies on compliance through the actions of its Parties nationally and, in ABNJ, through their actions as flag states and their participation in the sectoral agreements.
The United Nations processes
The UN has played an increasing role as a forum for global oceans issues, hosting a number of oceanrelated processes, including a periodic review of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the annual Open-ended
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, and annual negotiations of the Sustainable Fisheries and omnibus Oceans and Law of the Sea resolutions. Additionally, it has passed specific resolutions aimed at protecting marine species and habitats, and has launched a process to study issues related to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in ABNJ, discussed below.
UNGA resolutions
While UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions are considered to be 'soft law' (voluntary) [35] , when properly formulated they can, in practice, be very compelling, as evidenced by the indefinite moratorium on large scale drift net fishing adopted by UNGA Resolutions in 1990-1992 [36] . However, even with a clearly stated timeline, the 2011 UN review found that while some progress had been made, many further actions were required [38] . These findings reflected to a large degree what environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) [39] and also scientists [40] had been saying in separate reports; i.e. that the threat from bottom fishing to deep sea ecosystems, although reduced, still remains significant. Problems in the implementation of these measures have included problems in 'freezing of the fishing footprint' [41] , the selection of areas to be closed, and how best to engage the fishing industry. The importance of stakeholder engagement in ensuring compliance is well recognised [42] . However, an overly influential role for the offshore deep sea bottom fishing industry has arguably led to some poor conservation decisions, protecting areas of little interest from both a fishing and a conservation standpoint but failing to protect areas of both conservation and fishing interest [43] . Hence, a more balanced approach to implementation, which incorporates the provision of peer-reviewed science and transparent reporting procedures, is needed. 'Good practices' regarding the identification and protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) are now emerging (Ardron et al, this issue) and the lessons learnt might also be valuably applied elsewhere, such as in the protection of the EBSAs, discussed above [44] .
BBNJ
Recognising the need to better protect biodiversity in ABNJ, the UNGA decided in 2004 to establish
the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) [45] . BBNJ first met in 2006, where the delegations noted that "…existing mechanisms and institutions needed to apply a multi-sectoral and integrated approach to management and cooperate and coordinate to that end, thus moving away from their current sectoral approach" [46] . At subsequent BBNJ meetings there has been continued agreement that more could be achieved through better cooperation, coordination and implementation of existing global and regional arrangements. As resources from ABNJ, and capacity building and transfer of technology, there will likely be reluctance at BBNJ to proceed on issues related to marine conservation.
Spatial protection using existing instruments
Given the slow and uncertain progress of the UN discussions, other avenues for the protection of biodiversity in ABNJ should be considered. Legally, an ecosystem-based approach including a representative system of comprehensive MPAs that protect a full range of species and habitats, falls outside the scope of any single agreement [50] .
Sectoral agreements, by definition, apply only to sectoral activities. Conservation agreements, though possessing broader mandates, lack the powers necessary to regulate the major anthropogenic threats. The advantages of a new Implementing Agreement under UNCLOS to meet existing global commitments for integrated and precautionary management in ABNJ have been well articulated elsewhere [51] (Druel and Gjerde, this issue). In the absence of such agreement, however, the potential for more area-based management using existing agreements is worth exploring. Table 2 summarises the existing area-based management tools available in ABNJ. As Table 2 indicates, no single agreement has the mandate to establish comprehensive networks of MPAs. Half of the listed agreements have applicable tools, while half do not. This suggests both an opportunity for further application of existing agreements, as well as a need to expand the mandates of others to include the availability and application of spatial protection measures.
<Insert Table 2 about here>   Table 2 . Area-based management tools that are specified by international agreements or their implementing bodies.
Short name (full names in Table 1 )
Area-based tools in ABNJ Comments

UNCLOS none
Provides the legal framework for the sectoral and conservation agreements below. Requires the protection of rare and fragile ecosystems and the habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered species (Article 194.5) but no specific provisions.
Global sectoral agreements
Part XI Agreement [63] . Extrapolating to ABNJ, it is arguable that a site-based or sector-by-sector approach that selects areas based on their ecological or biological significance, using for example, the criteria and information developed by the CBD, could be a good place to start. In practice, the approach within national jurisdictions has been to proceed incrementally, first protecting a few key (often well-known) areas, and then progressively filling in gaps to move toward the goal of representativity. Admittedly this incremental approach is contrary to the objectives of systematic and complementary network planning [64] . However, it is unlikely that all ecologically important sites in ABNJ can be protected at once. Scheduled prioritisations, considering sites most critical to biodiversity (i.e. irreplaceable), and also under threat (i.e. vulnerable) is one pragmatic approach that has been used on land [65, 66] . A similar approach in ABNJ could be initiated using sector-specific area-based protection measures, considering critical sites most at risk from the sector's activities. Though just one aspect of MPA network design, 7 which alone would not meet internationally accepted commitments or objectives, it would at least be a worthy beginning.
Cooperation
The above discussion on spatial protection highlights the necessity of cooperation amongst efforts to secure such cooperation.) From a pragmatic perspective, the development of specialised agreements and governance arrangements to manage sector-specific activities makes sense. When it comes to the establishment of conservation measures designed to protect a broad range of species and habitats, however, an ecosystem approach is widely recommended; indeed, required by international law. This approach, which is incorporated in a range of related treaties and was adopted by the Parties to the CBD in 2000 [67] , requires looking at the (potential) impacts of human activities as a whole.
Cooperation as a legal duty
More than a valuable approach, cooperation is a legal duty. The duty of states to cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas is clearly articulated in 7 CBD decision IX/20 annex 2, has five criteria of which only the first is EBSAs.
Articles 117 and 118 of UNCLOS. 8 Similarly, Article 5 of the CBD calls for cooperation in ABNJ on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The status of the duty as a rule of customary international law binding on all states is now generally accepted [68] . However, the precise parameters and extent of the obligation remain unclear, making its implementation less than thorough. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that significant scope exists for increased cooperation not only between states but between and among the international agreements and governance bodies they have established.
Cooperation among 'siloes'
As noted above, since the conservation agreements do not have direct competence in the management of maritime activities they must rely on the sectoral agreements for implementation of their mandates through regulation of activities that may pose a threat to biodiversity as a whole.
Therefore, from the perspective of the conservation agreements, in order to meet their ecosystembased objectives, cooperation with the sectoral agreements is seen as advantageous and necessary.
However, from the perspective of the sectoral agreements, the advantages of cooperating with conservation agreements are perhaps less pressing or apparent.
For parties to sectoral agreements to better appreciate the value of such cooperation, three preconditions would likely have to be met: 1) broad acceptance by the sectoral agreements that there is a need for and potential benefits for the respective sectors in further conservation actions [69] ; 2) recognition of the duty in their underlying legal agreements to cooperate in the coordination of measures with other sectoral agreements; and 3) recognition of a duty to cooperate in the development of measures necessary for the protection and preservation of marine living resources with those bodies that have such expertise. It should be self-evident that international conservation agreements offer considerable expertise in this regard.
The CBD has been proactive in efforts to convene experts in biodiversity and fisheries to discuss topics of common concern. In December 2011, the CBD Secretariat convened a joint expert meeting to review the extent to which biodiversity concerns are addressed in existing assessments of fisheries stocks and to propose options to address biodiversity concerns [70] . This meeting brought together representatives of RFMOs, the Fisheries Expert Group of the International Union for Conservation of Nature's Commission on Ecosystem Management and other relevant organizations, processes and scientific groups. The meeting report noted that successive ICES expert reviews have found that there is fairly full attention to the major biodiversity considerations in the RFMO conventions and overarching high level policies but implementation is often highly variable and inadequate [71] . In some cases, the priority that fisheries management agencies could give to the biodiversity commitments in RFMO conventions and policies was constrained by these documents giving explicit primacy to single species Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) goals or other harvest goals for the single species [72] . The reviews also found that limits on knowledge of ecosystems and the fisheries and on capacities for assessments and management can impede the achievement of high level biodiversity goals [73] .
Vested interests impeding cooperation?
Another problem plaguing cooperation in ABNJ arises from the often tenuous distinction between regulator and regulated and the existence of vested interests. At the meetings of the sectoral agreements, states that participate in decision-making are also very often the direct or indirect beneficiaries of these decisions. For example, regional fisheries bodies are run almost exclusively 9 by
states with an active interest in the fisheries for that region. Thus, in fishing quota negotiations states typically determine allocations which benefit companies, nationals, and vessels under their flags.
With regard to shipping, those flag states with a larger stake in the industry (i.e. more registered tonnage) have greater say in decision-making affecting the industry. 10 Similarly, under UNCLOS and its Part XI Implementing Agreement, the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) is legally regarded as the common heritage of mankind and seabed mining is subject to the establishment of a benefit-sharing mechanism. Thus, in the ISA there is a broad expectation that mining profits will be shared. Hence there is also an incentive towards approving mining requests, since all Parties stand to gain. Admittedly, to date, decisions have related solely to exploration leases. Approval of commercial exploitation has yet to occur and the details of a benefitsharing mechanism have yet to be determined. Significant work has already taken place to delineate environmental responsibilities of States and their authorized Contractors. Nevertheless, the spectre of the adverse impact of vested interests on the decisions taken within the ISA is real.
Discussion
As noted above, considerable scope exists for the institutions already in place for managing fisheries, shipping, and seabed mining to be more proactive in addressing the most pressing of the current direct human threats to biodiversity in ABNJ. Continued delay serves only to buy time for those who seek to profit from the unsustainable use of the resources [74, 75] . Pending the adoption of a comprehensive global legal framework to designate ecologically coherent, representative networks of MPAs in ABNJ, experience from national jurisdictions suggests that the creation of protected area networks could at least be contributed to by focusing on significant areas first and then seeking to fill the representativity holes later. Without implying support for complacency, if meeting the MPA (and similar) commitments is viewed as a collective process requiring a variety of regional and global instruments working towards a shared goal (e.g. 10% protected areas), then arguably any step taken towards that goal using whatever tools are at our disposal should be seen as legitimate and useful.
The same logic applies to other measures such as environmental impact assessments, where singlesector measures are a necessary beginning. However, ultimately only cross-sectoral cooperation that addresses multiple species, habitats, and cumulative impacts, will provide the means to fully achieve conservation objectives.
Significantly, while the CBD EBSA process has been impressive in its scope and ambition, the question remains how to encourage the sectoral agreements to incorporate EBSAs into their planning and decision-making. The distribution of a letter between Secretariats is unlikely to be sufficient. EBSAs, like all conservation initiatives in ABNJ, will need strong State 'champions' if they are to become accepted outside of the CBD. Moreover, as discovered by the OSPAR Commission in its ongoing efforts to develop cooperative management plans for its high seas MPAs, attempting cross and intersectoral cooperation can add considerably to a secretariat's workload (Freestone et al, this issue).
Mechanisms to manage this workload increase would facilitate future progress. In addition, while secretariats can deliver messages back and forth to their respective COPs, greater cooperation would likely require the Parties themselves to come together; e.g. in a special joint-meeting or COP, or to adopt a joint programme or plan of action, or designate a joint science advisory body or process.
Given the obvious synergies and economies of scale to be gained by joining forces and sharing expertise across the conservation-sectoral divide, these possibilities are worth further examination. A common global mandate from a UNGA resolution (or indeed a new global agreement), accompanied by funding to incentivize cooperation, would stimulate progress.
To date, cooperation has shown itself to be the Achilles heel of the existing constellation of agreements. Currently, a proposal originating in a conservation agreement must find a government that is also a member of a sectoral agreement willing to shepherd it through the intricacies of the sectoral agreement's regulatory approval process. Thus, even though many governments may support a given conservation measure, finding one willing to champion it can be difficult. A better procedure, which would build cooperation, might be one that allowed for a secretariat from one agreement body to officially submit proposals to another.
In any event, for those who argue that the existing agreements are alone sufficient to achieve the protection of biodiversity, they will have to better demonstrate how inter-agreement cooperation can be achieved. As mentioned above, the CBD has investigated cooperation between RFMOs and conservation organisations and has made a number of recommendations, as yet unimplemented, as to how cooperation might be improved [76] . Further guidance might also be gleaned from studying the recent experience of the merger of the Secretariats of the Basel, Stockholm and Rotterdam
Conventions. Whatever approaches are taken, however, it is clear that the greater use of existing mechanisms is not itself a panacea or a quick fix. Rather it represents a sensible approach to making the most of existing arrangements without in any way foreclosing the possibility of the adoption of a better, more comprehensive, integrated approach to the protection of marine biodiversity in ABNJ.
